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I. INTRODUCTION 
Charitable organizations1 employ a variety of methods for 
 
       † J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. University of 
Minnesota, English Literature, Computer Science. 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (7th ed. 1999) (defining charitable 
organization as “[a] tax-exempt organization that (1) is created and operated 
1
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raising funds and educating the public about their causes and 
activities.2  The act of asking individuals for money is common to 
most charities.3  While there is nothing inherently fraudulent about 
charitable solicitation, the potential for fraud and abuse has led 
most states to enact legislation regulating fundraising.4  The ability 
 
exclusively for religious, scientific, literary, educational, athletic, public-safety, or 
community service purposes.”).  The Internal Revenue Service definition expands 
the classifications of purpose, but includes the prohibitions against any part of the 
net earnings inuring “to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual” or 
involvement in political campaigns “on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.”  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2004).  The definition 
commonly seen in case law defines a charity as a gift benefiting the public “by 
bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by 
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to 
establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or 
works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.”  Jackson v. Phillips, 96 
Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867); see also Junior Achievement of Greater 
Minneapolis, Inc. v. State, 271 Minn. 385, 390, 135 N.W.2d 881, 885 (1965).  See 
also BLACK’S, supra, at 343 (defining nonprofit corporation as one “organized for 
some purpose other than making a profit, and usually afforded special tax 
treatment”). 
 2. See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF FUNDRAISING ch. 7 (3d ed. 2002 
& supp. 2004) (describing state and federal regulations of charitable solicitation, 
charitable sales promotion, and charity auctions); ASSOCIATION OF FUNDRAISING 
PROFESSIONALS, THE AFP FUNDRAISING DICTIONARY ONLINE (2003), at 
http://www.afpnet.org/content_documents/AFP_Dictionary_A-Z_final_6-9-03.pdf 
(defining a wide variety of terms used in the course of soliciting charitable funds). 
 3. Charitable giving is a complex behavior that involves the financial 
resources of the individual, the need of the organization, and the cause or 
program being supported.  Tax incentives such as deductibility of contributions 
may influence the amount given.  Donations to organizations granted tax-exempt 
status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) are deductible to taxpayers who itemize, with some 
limitations.  See I.R.C. § 170 (West 2004) (granting a deduction for “charitable 
contributions,” which are defined as “a contribution or gift to or for the use of . . 
.[a corporation] organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary, or educational purposes . . .”). 
 4. Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia require some form of 
charitable solicitation registration.  ALA. CODE §§ 13A-9-70-76 (2003); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 45.68.010-.900 (Michie 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-6551 to -6561 (2004); ARK. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 4-28-401 to -416 (Michie 2003); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12580-99.5 
(West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-16-101 to -113 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 
21A-175 to -194 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-1701 to -1714 (2004); FLA. STAT. ch. 
496.401-424 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-17-1, 43-17-23 (2004); 225 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 460/1-23 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 17-1759 to -1776 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 367.650-670 (Michie 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1901-1901.1 (West 
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 5001-16 (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. 
REG. §§ 6-101 to -102 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 68, §§ 18-35 (2004); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS §§ 400.271-294 (2004); MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-61 (2003); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 79-11-501 to -529 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.450-89 (2004); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 7:19-32-b (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:17A-18 to -40 (2004); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-22-1 to -11 (Michie 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 171-a to 177 
2
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to regulate charitable solicitation is not without limits, however.  
During the 1980s, state and local officials attempted to enact 
legislation that sought to protect the public from fraud and 
required open, accountable, and effective charitable organizations.  
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court decided that some of 
these regulations impinged on the First Amendment rights of the 
charity to educate the public about its cause.5 
Because the Court held that charitable solicitation had an 
educational and advocacy component, the regulation of which was 
subject to strict scrutiny,6 it was unclear whether a fraud cause of 
action could proceed against a professional fundraiser acting on 
behalf of a charity.7  By its unanimous decision in Illinois ex rel. 
 
(Consol. 2004); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 131F-1 to -4 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-22-
01 to -07 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1716.01-99 (Anderson 2004); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 18, §§ 552.1-18 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 128.801-898 (2003); 10 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 162.1-24 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 5-53.1-1 to -18 (2003); S.C. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 33-56-10 to 56-200 (Law Co-op. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-
501 to -521 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-22-1 to -23 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-
48 to -69 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.09.010-915 (2004); W. VA. CODE §§ 
29-19-1 to -15b (2004); WIS. STAT. §§ 440.41-48 (2003).  Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and 
Wyoming require no registration. See The Unified Registration Statement at 
http://www.multistatefiling.org (July 30, 2003).  See also A MODEL ACT CONCERNING 
THE SOLICITATION OF FUNDS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES (Nat’l Assoc. of State Charity 
Officials, et al. 1986), at http://www.nasconet.org/public.php?pubsec=4&sdpid=21 
&curdoc=240 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).  States that do not require the charity to 
register may still require the professional fundraiser to register or the charity to 
file copies of contracts with professional fundraisers.  See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 
467B-6, B-12 (2003). 
 5. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec’y of 
State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
 6. See, e.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 (refusing to “separate the component parts 
of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole.”). 
 7. See People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 289, 299 
(Ill. 2001) (concluding that there is no “nexus between high solicitation costs and 
fraud and attempts to regulate defendant’s constitutionally protected solicitations 
on that basis”); People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 729 N.E.2d 965, 
971 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (upholding the grant of dismissal to the defendant and 
finding “the type of allegations made by the Attorney General’s complaint violate 
the First Amendment and have been thoroughly discredited by the Supreme 
Court”).  The depth of this uncertainty is apparent in the question certified for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court, which read, “Whether the First Amendment 
categorically prohibits a State from pursuing a fraud action against a professional 
fundraiser who represents that donations will be used for charitable purposes but 
in fact keeps the vast majority (in this case 85 percent) of all funds donated.”  (Pet. 
for Cert. I).  Lisa Madigan replaced Jack Ryan as Illinois Attorney General after the 
completion of the state-level litigation, but before the U.S. Supreme Court heard 
the appeal.  See Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Lisa Madigan Takes Oath 
3
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Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., the Court determined that 
the First Amendment did not protect fraudulent charitable 
solicitations.8 
This holding reflects the culmination of previous cases 
adjudicating the First Amendment rights of fundraisers.  The 
decision also guides state and local regulators to a means of 
achieving their public policy goals of protecting the public from 
fraudulent charitable solicitations.  The decision is meant to 
balance the protection of the public from fraudulent solicitations 
with a charity’s right to speak, educate, and solicit funds. 
The regulatory landscape has changed in the ten years leading 
up to the Telemarketing Associates decision.  Disclosures by charities 
of their overall finances as well as their contractual relationships 
with professional fundraisers are the norm.  Public disclosures of 
that information, particularly on the Internet, provide donors and 
regulators with a generous amount of information on which to base 
decisions.  As a result, regulators and the public have more 
information with which to combat fraud. 
There is irony in the fact that the best means of preventing 
fraud may be a fraud cause of action itself.  By focusing on fraud, 
the Court has highlighted an area of speech that does not deserve 
the same level of protection as charitable solicitation.  Fraud 
prosecution, then, can be wielded as a tool to combat unscrupulous 
fundraisers.  Fraud litigation against charities and paid professional 
fundraisers in the wake of the Telemarketing Associates decision 
indicate that the most egregious offenders can be stopped through 
coordinated anti-fraud campaigns. 
This Note first examines the history of the relevant law in the 
areas of fraud, charitable solicitation, and prior restraints.9  
Specifically, it examines the three leading cases on regulation of 
charitable fundraising speech: Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley.10  
Next, the Note discusses the history and holding of Illinois ex rel. 
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.11  Next, this Note will 
 
of Office as First Female Illinois Attorney General (Jan. 13, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 8. 538 U.S. 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).  “What the First Amendment 
and our case law emphatically do not require, however, is a blanket exemption 
from fraud liability for a fundraiser who intentionally misleads in calls for 
donations.”  Id. at 621. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
4
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explore the holding in Telemarketing Associates in light of Schaumburg 
and its progeny.12  This analysis includes a survey of recent and 
pending fraud litigation against charities and their fundraisers, and 
a review of the Federal Trade Commission’s “Operation Phoney 
Philanthropy.”13  Finally, the Note concludes with some regulatory 
considerations for charities, fundraisers, and regulators as they 
proceed in the post-Telemarketing Associates era. 
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW 
A. The Charitable Solicitation Regulatory Environment Before 
Schaumburg 
Fraud is “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or 
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or 
her detriment.”14  Specifically, fraud in the charitable context 
involves soliciting funds in the name of a charity with the intention 
that little, if any, of the funds raised would go to the charity for 
program activities as the donor intended.15  The Supreme Court 
has regularly found fraudulent speech to be of low value, and 
therefore unprotected.16  Charitable fraud is no different in this 
 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. Id.  This play on words was lost on the Connecticut Attorney General’s 
Office.  See infra note 140. 
 14. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 670.  The elements of the intentional tort of 
fraud (or deceit) are generally 1) false representation with 2) knowledge that the 
representation is false 3) that the plaintiff relies on 4) to his or her detriment.  W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS ch. 18 § 105 (5th ed. 1984).  
See also 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 1 (2003) (discussing the broad nature of 
fraud as the “multifarious means that human ingenuity can devise and that are 
resorted to by one individual to gain advantage over another by false suggestions 
or by suppression of truth”). 
 15. See, e.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Police Hall of Fame, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 665, 
677 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (listing concealment of costs, sham corporate entities, 
unauthorized charges, and donor list making for personal gain as fraudulent 
activities).  See also People v. Stone, 197 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) 
(failing to inform the contributing public of 45 percent professional fundraising 
fee is fraud); People v. Nat’l Cancer Hosp. of Am., 102 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1951) (calling an eighteen percent return to the charity from a 
fundraising appeal a false representation when not accompanied by a disclosure of 
the deductions). 
 16. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).  “[T]here is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.  Neither the intentional lie nor the 
careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open’ debate on public issues.”  Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
5
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regard.17 
Charitable solicitation is principally regulated by the states 
through their representative attorneys general18 as an exercise of 
the police power.19  In some cases, counties20 and cities21 have 
instituted charitable regulations.  Typically, charity regulators 
attempt to protect the public from fraud by imposing disclosure 
requirements.22  Many of the attempts by states and municipalities 
 
 17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (noting that a state may 
use its penal laws to protect its citizens by punishing fraudulent solicitations 
committed “under the cloak of religion”); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 
(1939) (denouncing fraud, including appeals “made in the name of charity and 
religion” as offenses punishable by law).  But see United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 
653, 657 (2d Cir. 1952) (labeling intent as a “practically crucial” element of fraud 
despite less than seven percent of $120,000 raised being used for charitable 
purposes). 
 18. See John W. Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney 
General, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243, 246-50 (2004) (describing the early English and 
American common law authority of charitable regulation).  In most states this has 
been written into statute.  See statutes cited supra note 4.  In addition to regulation 
of charitable solicitations, most charity regulators have broad powers to enforce 
the fiduciary duties of directors and officers.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 317A.467 
(2003) (describing the attorney general’s power to seek broad equitable relief for 
any violation of chapter 317A). 
 19. Nat’l Found. v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(citations omitted).  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.  “It is a traditional exercise 
of the States' ‘police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.’”  
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 475 (1996)).  See also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (stating that a state can 
regulate the time, place, and manner of charitable solicitation as a means to 
“safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community . . . .”). 
 20. See, e.g., Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. 
Pinellas County, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (challenging a Pinellas 
County, Florida registration ordinance on due process grounds); Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness of W. Pa. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Pa. 1977) 
[hereinafter Krishna Consciousness]. 
 21. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (describing a city 
ordinance that prohibited ringing doorbells or knocking on doors of residences); 
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (reviewing a municipal ordinance 
that required validation of the cause by the police before solicitation could occur); 
Nat’l Found., 415 F.2d at 43 nn.1-2. 
 22. Charities interested in soliciting funds may be required to register and 
provide information, including the names and salaries of directors, purposes and 
methods of solicitation, and copies of contracts between the charity and 
professional fundraisers.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 309.52 (2003).  Charities may also 
be required to provide detailed financial information on an annual basis.  See, e.g., 
id. § 309.53.  Professional fundraisers may be required to post a bond and state 
affirmatively the percentage of funds raised received by the charity.  See, e.g., id. § 
309.531. 
6
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to regulate or restrict the ability of charitable and religious groups 
to solicit, advocate, or canvass have conflicted with the First 
Amendment.23  Because the charitable solicitation was the most 
likely source of fraud within the charity’s operations, a common 
regulatory technique involved limiting the percentage cost of 
fundraising relative to the amount raised.24 
Unfortunately, state and federal courts were unable to reach 
consensus about whether such limits were appropriate exercises of 
the police power of the states and their political subdivisions25 or 
prior restraints on speech that violated the First Amendment rights 
of charities and religious groups.26  In three separate decisions 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Hynes, 425 U.S. at 621-23 (holding as vague an 
ordinance that required police notice before canvassing); Martin, 319 U.S. at 153-
54 (voiding an ordinance that prohibited door knocking or doorbell ringing in 
order to deliver handbills to residents); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 413-14 
(1943) (overturning an ordinance prohibiting “distribution” of handbills); 
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307 (prohibiting a state determination of what constitutes a 
religious cause before granting a license for the “perpetuation of religious views or 
systems”); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163-64 (nullifying a canvassing ordinance that 
targeted non-commercial speech such as religious, political, or social 
information); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (characterizing 
as overly broad an ordinance that required city manager permission before 
literature distribution). 
 24. See, e.g., Nat’l Found., 415 F.2d at 43 n.2 (authorizing the city secretary to 
deny fundraising permits to organizations when the cost of fundraising exceeds 20 
percent of funds raised); Krishna Consciousness, 437 F. Supp. at 667 (imposing a 
rebuttable presumption of fraud on fundraising costs exceeding twenty-five 
percent of charitable solicitations conducted at county airports); Hillman v. 
Britton, 168 Cal. Rptr. 852, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (describing a Fresno 
ordinance that held fundraising costs over 15 percent to be unreasonable).  See 
also Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Validity and Application of Governmental Limitation 
on Permissible Amount or Proportion of Fundraising Expenses or Administrative Costs of 
Charitable Organizations, 15 A.L.R.4th 1163 (1995). 
 25. Nat’l Found., 415 F.2d at 46 (providing an opportunity for the charity to 
show the reasonableness of its high fundraising costs was flexible and acceptable); 
Krishna Consciousness, 437 F. Supp. at 671 (finding the fundraising costs provision 
constitutionally sound, but requiring a speedy appeals process for permit denials); 
People ex rel. Scott, 376 N.E.2d at 674 (upholding a state statute requiring seventy-
five percent of gross receipts collected be used for charitable purposes). 
 26. Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (concluding 
that an airport restriction on solicitation was a prior restraint without proper 
safeguards); Swearson v. Meyers, 455 F. Supp. 88, 90-94 (D. Kan. 1978) (granting 
of a license to solicit based on a determination of what is a religious cause is 
unconstitutional); Hillman, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 858-61 (discussing prior restraints in 
the area of charitable solicitation without deciding on their exact contours).  Prior 
restraints interfere with the content of speech before it is delivered or published.  
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931).  In the charitiable solicitation 
context, there is concern for licenses that may be denied arbitrarily without due 
process.  See Fernandes, 465 F. Supp. at 501-02 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
7
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dating from the 1980s, the Court struck down legislation and 
ordinances that sought to prevent fraud by regulating charitable 
solicitation based on percentage of donations used for fundraising 
costs.27  In each case, the means of protecting legitimate state or 
municipal interests such as preventing fraudulent solicitation of its 
citizens were insufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand strict 
scrutiny.28 
These cases built upon each other in two significant ways.  
First, as each rule or statute was struck down, attempts were made 
to bring existing laws in line with the Supreme Court decisions 
without sacrificing the desire for broad protections against 
fraudulent solicitation.  Second, the holdings in each case broaden 
the First Amendment protection of charitable solicitation, while 
making attempts at regulation based on fundraising expenses more 
difficult, if not impossible.  It was within the existing contours of 
these decisions that the Supreme Court decided Telemarketing 
Associates.29 
B. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
The first of the three major cases to present the issue of prior 
restraints on charitable solicitation was Village of Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment.30  In that case, the Village of 
Schaumburg (“Schaumburg”) adopted a measure that required 
charities obtain a permit prior to soliciting funds either door-to-
door or in the public streets.31  Furthermore, the ordinance 
required that permit applications include “[s]atisfactory proof that 
at least seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solicitations will 
be used directly for the charitable purposes of the organization.”32 
 
U.S. 51 (1965)) (discussing procedural safeguards for speech regulation); Hillman 
168 Cal. Rptr. at 858-61 (same). 
 27. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); 
Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
 28. See cases cited supra note 27. 
 29. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 
612-18 (2003) (describing the history of the trilogy of cases and the prophylactic 
measures designed to prevent fraud in charitable solicitation). 
 30. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
 31. Id. at 623. 
 32. Id. at 624 (quoting SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 22-20(g) (1974)).  
Organizations were required to submit a certified audit or similar documentation 
detailing the distribution of funds raised.  Id. at 624 n.4 (quoting SCHAUMBURG, 
ILL., CODE § 22-20).  The ordinance required charities to exclude from the 
8
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The Court analyzed the Schaumburg ordinance with respect to 
some basic principles set down by previous decisions.33  The Court 
reiterated the fundamental protection the First Amendment 
provides to charitable solicitations.34 The Court characterized the 
speech aspects of charitable solicitation as: 
Involv[ing] a variety of speech interests—communication 
of information, the dissemination and propagation of 
views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes . . . .  
[S]olicitation is characteristically intertwined with 
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking 
support for particular causes or for particular views on 
economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality 
that without solicitation the flow of such information and 
advocacy would likely cease . . . .  Furthermore, because 
charitable solicitation does more than inform private 
economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with 
providing information about the characteristics and costs 
of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our 
cases as a variety of purely commercial speech.35 
Reasonable regulation of such speech is allowable only to the 
extent that it is sufficiently specific and narrowly tailored to avoid 
acting as a prior restraint on such speech.36 
The Court examined Schaumburg’s interest to determine if it 
was sufficiently strong to justify the restriction of protected speech 
 
charitable purpose “[s]alaries or commissions paid to solicitors [and] 
[a]dministrative expenses of the organization.”  Id. (quoting SCHAUMBURG, ILL., 
CODE § 22-20(g)). 
 33. Id. at 628-33.  See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) 
(recognizing the power of a municipality to enforce reasonable regulations when 
appropriately narrow and specific); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (barring 
an absolute prohibition against the distribution of handbills involving a religious 
purpose because of the solicitation of funds); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940) (holding a statute requiring a license to solicit funds for religious, 
charitable, or philanthropic purposes as an invalid prior restraint on the free 
exercise of a religion); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) 
(acknowledging the potential for fraud in charitable or religious solicitations, but 
holding nonetheless that licensing requirements constitute an unconstitutional 
abridgement of freedom of speech). 
 34. Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. 
 35. Id.  This characterization was by no means unanimous.  Id. at 644 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  “While such activity may be worthy of heightened 
protection when limited to the dissemination of information . . . a simple request 
for money lies far from the core protections of the First Amendment as heretofore 
interpreted.”  Id. (citations omitted).  The dissent analogized future governmental 
attempts to regulate charitable solicitation as task worthy of Sisyphus.  Id. at 639. 
 36. Id. at 637. 
9
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prompted by the seventy-five percent fundraising requirement.37  
The Court considered that Schaumburg had a legitimate interest in 
preventing fraud, but held that there was an insufficient 
relationship between the fundraising prohibition and the seventy-
five percent threshold.38  High fundraising costs can result from “a 
wide range of variables, many of which are beyond the control of 
the organization.”39  Instead, the Court encouraged efforts that 
sought to punish fraudulent misrepresentations directly or by 
promoting disclosures that inform the public about the charity’s 
finances.40 
C.    Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. 
The Court next took up the issue of restrictions on charitable 
solicitation in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.41 
The statute at issue was similar to the Schaumburg ordinance in 
that it sought to limit fundraising expenses to twenty-five percent.42  
However, the statute differed significantly because it offered 
charities a means to avoid the twenty-five percent ceiling if the limit 
would prevent the organization from fundraising.43  The parties in 
 
 37. Id. at 636. 
 38. Id. at 637.  “[C]haritable solicitation is not so inherently conductive to 
fraud and overreaching as to justify its prohibition.” Id. at 638 n.11. 
 39. Id. at 637 n.10. 
 40. Id. at 637-38.  “Illinois law, for example, requires charitable organizations 
to register with the State Attorney General’s Office and to report certain 
information about their structure and fundraising activities.”  Id. at 638 n.12 
(citing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 23 § 5102(a) (1977)). 
 41. 467 U.S. 947 (1984) [hereinafter Munson].  Other cases decided in the 
interim interpreted the Court’s holding in Village of Schaumburg differently.  See 
Nat’l Black United Fund, Inc. v. Campbell, 494 F. Supp. 748, 759 (D.C. 1980) 
(finding a twenty-five percent administrative and fundraising expense cap to be 
reasonable on its face, but “applied in a manner which sweeps quite broadly, 
precluding participation by organizations well within the proper purpose of the 
[fundraising campaign].”); Holloway v. Brown, 403 N.E.2d 191, 196 (Ohio 1980) 
(distinguishing the instant ordinance from that at issue in Village of Schaumburg 
because of a higher percentage limit on costs and a rebuttable presumption of 
unreasonableness). 
 42. Munson, 467 U.S. at 951.  “A charitable organization . . . may not pay or 
agree to pay as expenses in connection with any fund-raising activity a total 
amount in excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or received by 
reason of the fund-raising activity.”  Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN. § 103D(a) 
(1982)). 
 43. Id.  “The Secretary of State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a 
charitable organization to pay or agree to pay for expenses in connection with its 
fund-raising activity . . . in those instances where the 25% limitation would 
effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.” Id. n.2 
10
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Munson also differed from those in Schaumburg.44  The Joseph H. 
Munson Co. (“Munson”) was not a charitable organization, but a 
professional fundraising business that solicited funds on behalf of 
Maryland nonprofit organizations, specifically the Fraternal Order 
of Police.45 
In Munson the Court found the availability of a discretionary 
waiver from the Secretary of State was not sufficient to meet the 
First Amendment challenge.46  The Court did not find the statute a 
suitable means for achieving the goal of preventing fraudulent 
charitable solicitation.47  The Court described the poor fit between 
the goal of the statute and the potential misapplication as: 
operat[ing] on a fundamentally mistaken premise that 
high solicitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud.  
That the statute in some of its applications actually 
prevents the misdirection of funds from the organization’s 
purported charitable goal is little more than fortuitous.  It 
is equally likely that the statute will restrict First 
Amendment activity that results in high costs but is itself a 
part of the charity’s goal or that is simply attributable to 
the fact that the charity’s cause proves to be unpopular. 
On the other hand, if an organization indulges in fraud, 
there is nothing in the percentage limitation that prevents 
it from misdirecting funds. In either event, the percentage 
limitation, though restricting solicitation costs, will have 
done nothing to prevent fraud.48 
The waiver notwithstanding, the Maryland statute, like the 
Schaumburg ordinance, was insufficiently narrowly tailored to 
avoid a First Amendment challenge.49 
The dissent in Munson, however, saw a more substantial link 
between high fundraising costs and fraud.50  Calling the statute a 
form of economic regulation, the dissent found only an indirect 
 
(quoting MD. CODE ANN. § 103D(a) (1982)). 
 44. See id. at 950; Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 620. 
 45. Munson, 467 U.S. at 950.  Because Munson was a for-profit, professional 
fundraising organization not directly targeted by the statute, the Court had to 
address the issue of Munson’s standing to sue.  Id. at 954-60.  The Court held that 
Munson satisfied the “case or controversy” requirement and satisfactorily framed 
the issues for an over breadth challenge to the statute.  Id. at 958-60.  See also U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 46. Munson, 467 U.S. at 962-69. 
 47. Id. at 966-67. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 970. 
 50. Id. at 980 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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impact on protected expression.51  The regulation would impose a 
price control on the market that may drive marginal producers out 
of the charitable solicitation business, but protected expression 
would not be fundamentally harmed.52 
Moreover, the dissent argued that the statute should withstand 
even heightened scrutiny because strong government interests are 
present.53  Such a statute coincides with the public’s expectation of 
how the charity uses donated charitable dollars, thereby bolstering 
confidence.54  In those cases where a donor is unaware that only a 
small portion of the funds raised actually goes to the charity, the 
dissent would find “an element of fraud.”55  Regardless of whether 
or not the percentages retained by the fundraiser are disclosed to 
the donor, the state has an interest in keeping charitable 
solicitation costs low and protecting charities from being 
“overcharged by unscrupulous professional fundraisers.”56 
D. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina 
At issue in the third case of the charitable solicitation trio, Riley 
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, was the state’s 
amended Charitable Solicitation Act.57  The Act contained two 
provisions that a coalition of fundraisers and charitable 
organizations challenged on First Amendment grounds.58  The first 
provision provided for a three-tiered scale of reasonableness for 
fundraising expenses.59  The Act deemed fees reasonable if they 
were under twenty percent of the total collected.60  Fees between 
twenty and thirty-five percent were presumed reasonable, while 
those in excess of thirty-five percent were presumed 
unreasonable.61  The second provision required professional 
 
 51. Id. at 978. 
 52. Id. at 979-80. 
 53. Id. at 980. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  “[A] high fundraising fee itself betrays 
the expectations of the donor who thinks that his money will be used to benefit 
the charitable purpose in the name of which the money was solicited.”  Id. at 980 
n.2. 
 56. Id. at 980. 
 57. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 58. Id. at 785-87. 
 59. Id. at 784-85 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT § 131C-17.2 (1986)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id at 785.  As in Munson, the statute contained a provision that allowed 
the presumption to be rebutted if the fee could be proved necessary “either (1) 
12
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fundraisers to affirmatively disclose the amount of funds retained 
for themselves.62 
Aware of the Court’s previous holdings that charitable 
solicitations are protected speech and that fee percentage-based 
restrictions were not sufficiently related to fraud prevention, North 
Carolina posited two distinctions for its regulatory scheme: 
guaranteeing reasonable fees to maximize funds flowing to the 
charity and the flexibility of the tiered approach.63  For the first 
distinction, the Court examined two possible premises.64  First, the 
Court considered whether charities are “economically unable to 
negotiate fair or reasonable contracts without governmental 
assistance.”65  The Court disposes of this possibility by citing a lack 
of evidence of inequitable contracts and a failure to narrowly tailor 
a regulation that restricts speech.66 
The second possible premise for the “reasonable fee” 
requirement was a state interest in regulation protecting the charity 
from an undertaking that would be harmful to its own interest.67  
This premise did not survive even a superficial First Amendment 
analysis.68  Moreover, the court examined “legitimate reasons” for a 
charity to reject the state’s interest in ensuring “reasonable” 
fundraising fees.69  The Court acknowledged that a charity might 
make trade-offs regarding the type of fundraising drive, the costs of 
 
because the solitication involved the dissemination of information or advocacy on 
public issues directed by the charity, or (2) because otherwise the charity’s ability 
to raise money or communicate would be significantly diminished.”  Id. at 785-86 
(paraphrasing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131C-17.2(d)(1)-(2) (1986)). 
 62. Id. at 786.  Unchallenged portions of the statute required the disclosure 
of the professional fundraiser’s name, his or her employer’s name, and the 
employer’s address.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 789-90. 
 64. Id. at 790. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  During oral arguments the Court indicated that each of the sixty 
charities that stated a position voiced their opposition to the statute, prompting 
North Carolina to label them as “misinformed regarding the pro-charity nature of 
the statute.”  Id. at 790 n.6 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. at 20-21). 
 67. Id. at 790 (calling the premise “paternalistic”). 
 68. Id. at 790-91. 
[T]he government, even with the purest of motives, may not substitute its 
judgment as to how best to speak for that for speakers and listeners . . . .  
Consequently, even if the State had a valid interest in protecting charities 
from their own naiveté or economic weakness, the Act would not be 
narrowly tailored to achieve it. 
Id. at 791-92. 
 69. Id. 
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the drive, short-term benefits, educational opportunities, and any 
other benefits that the charity may achieve through its 
fundraising.70  The Court regarded opportunities for advocacy and 
education to be sufficient to justify a sacrifice in the amount of 
funds raised.71 
North Carolina cited the flexibility of its tiered approach to 
“reasonableness” as a key distinction between this Act and previous 
regulatory frameworks struck down by the Supreme Court.72  
However, having found the “generalized interest in unilaterally 
imposing its notions of fairness on the fundraising contract [to be] 
both constitutionally invalid and insufficiently related to a 
percentage-based test,” the Court returned to familiar territory: was 
the flexibility of the regulation sufficiently narrowly tailored to the 
particular interest of protecting a charity from fraud?73  Not 
surprisingly, the Court, citing Munson, denied the presence of a 
“nexus between the percentage of funds retained by the fundraiser 
and the likelihood that the solicitation is fraudulent.”74  Even the 
rebuttable presumption of the top tier was insufficient to convince 
the Court that this Act would not have a chilling effect on speech.75  
The Court was unwilling to allow the possibility that a factfinder 
might decide that costs or fees were excessive despite any advocacy 
or educational content of the speech.76 
The second statutory feature that the Court examined was the 
requirement of an affirmative disclosure of the percentage of 
charitable contributions retained by the professional fundraiser.77  
Acknowledging that the commercial and educational aspects of 
charitable solicitation are intertwined, and relying on its previous 
 
 70. Id. at 792. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 793. 
 75. Id. “Whether one views this as a restriction on the charities’ ability to 
speak, or a restriction of the professional fundraisers’ ability to speak, the 
restriction is undoubtedly one on speech, and cannot be countenanced here.”  Id. 
at 794 (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 793. 
 77. Id. at 795.  Intervening court decisions pointed to a split on the issue of 
affirmative disclosures.  Heritage Publ’g Co. v. Fishman, 634 F. Supp. 1489, 1505 
(D.Minn. 1986) (upholding the disclosure portions of the charitable solicitation 
statute while finding other portions unconstitutional in light of Schaumburg and 
Munson); State v. Events Int’l, Inc., 528 A.2d 458, 461-62 (Me. 1987) (striking 
down a disclosure provision that was linked to a seventy percent fundraising cost 
threshold). 
14
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holdings in Schaumburg and Munson, the Court refused to “parcel 
out the speech, applying one test to one phase and another test to 
another phase.”78  As a result, the Court applied the heightened test 
for a regulation that addresses a compelling state interest through 
narrowly tailored means.79 
The Court did not find North Carolina’s interest in 
enlightening potential donors about the costs of a fundraising 
campaign to be compelling.80  As in the previous cases, the Court 
reminded the state that “the charity reaps a substantial benefit from 
the act of solicitation itself.”81  The Court also pointed to the 
unchallenged portions of the statute that required affirmative 
disclosure of the professional capacity of the fundraiser, and the 
requirement to provide the percentage information to donors who 
inquire.82  Nor did the Court find the statute sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to avoid chilling otherwise protected speech.83 
Significantly, the Court suggested other methods of achieving 
a narrowly tailored response to the state’s concerns.84  Most relevant 
to this discussion is the Court’s urging to the state to “vigorously 
enforce its antifraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from 
obtaining money on false pretenses or by making false 
statements.”85  So, on the one hand, the Court put legislative and 
rulemaking bodies on notice that charitable solicitation was highly 
 
 78. Id. at 796. 
 79. Id. at 798.  The Court recognized that there was a different interest 
involved in compelled speech and compelled silence, but found the distinction 
“without constitutional significance” in the realm of protected speech.  Id. at 796. 
 80. Id. at 798. 
 81. Id. (citing Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 
963 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 635 
(1980)). 
 82. Id. at 799.  The Court gave a clear indication of its opinion of such 
positive disclosures when it stated, “[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to 
suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his 
or her professional status.  On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored requirement 
would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.”  Id. at 799 n.11.  Other states have 
similar affirmative disclosure requirements.  See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/17 
(2003) (requiring prompt disclosure of paid professional fundraiser status); MINN. 
STAT. § 309.556, subd. 2 (2003) (requiring disclosure of the name of the 
professional fundraiser and their status as “professional fund-raiser” prior to any 
oral contribution request). 
 83. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799-800 (calling the measure “prophylactic, imprecise, 
and unduly burdensome”). 
 84. Id. at 800. 
 85. Id. 
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protected speech.86  On the other hand, the Court spotlighted a 
tool that states’ attorneys general could use to achieve the same 
end: fraud prosecutions. 
Not surprisingly, commentators analyzed the three opinions 
and speculated on possible future regulatory challenges.87  There 
was a sense that the Court had gone too far to protect aspects of 
charitable solicitation to the detriment of regulators,88 donors,89 
and the charities themselves.90  Potential solutions included 
mandatory disclosure requirements, public education campaigns to 
educate donors, and self-policing by the charitable sector.91  Fifteen 
years after the Court’s decision in Riley, the Supreme Court again 
addressed the interests of these constituencies as well as the 
 
 86. See Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 
1989) (affirming the unconstitutionality of three of four challenged provisions of 
Virginia’s charitable solicitation statute); Indiana Voluntary Fireman’s Ass’n v. 
Pearson, 700 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (finding unconstitutional three of four 
provisions of Indiana’s statute related to affirmative disclosures); People v. French, 
762 P.2d 1369, 1375 (Colo. 1988) (“The state interest of informing citizens of the 
percentage of contributions actually retained by the charitable organization does 
not rise to the level of a compelling state interest.”); WRG Enters. v. Crowell, 758 
S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tenn. 1988) (“The Riley case stands for the proposition that a 
percentage based regulation upon the fees to be collected by professional 
solicitors is an unconstitutional invasion upon the First Amendment rights of 
charities and fund raisers alike.  The Tennessee statute falls within the ambit of 
that proscription.”). 
 87. Stephen H. Block, The Post-Riley Era: An Analysis of First Amendment 
Protection of Charitable Fundraising, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 101 (1991); John 
Dziedzic, Comment, Krishna v. Lee Extricates the Inextricable: An Argument for 
Regulating the Solicitation in Charitable Solicitations, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 665 
(1994); Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for 
Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (1991); Jon Strauss, First 
Amendment Protection of Charitable Solicitation, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 669 (1992). 
 88. See Dziedzic, supra note 87, at 690-98 (proposing a regulatory focus on the 
transactional aspect of charitable solicitation and advocating for a “Donor’s Bill of 
Rights”). 
 89. Espinoza, supra note 87, at 607.  “Unfortunately, following Schaumburg, 
the Court moved too far in protecting the rights of charities and ignored the 
contributors’ interest in ensuring that charitable contributions be used for 
charitable purposes.”  Id. 
 90. Id. at 620-21.  Espinoza argues that the intertwining of programmatic and 
solicitation speech undermines charity.  Id. at 620.  “The rhetoric of intertwining 
camouflages the profound redefinition of charity that permeates the Schaumburg 
analysis.  A charity’s ability to seek support should be different from a charity’s 
ability to shield itself from financial scrutiny.” Id. at 621. 
 91. Block, supra note 87, at 124-25 (rejecting self-policing and public 
education in favor of additional disclosure requirements at the point of 
solicitation). 
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balance between protected speech and fraud.92 
III. CASE HISTORY 
A. Facts 
VietNow is an Illinois charity that educates its members about 
issues important to veterans of the Viet Nam War such as 
homelessness and Agent Orange.93  Telemarketing Associates, Inc. 
(“Telemarketing”) and Armet, Inc. (“Armet”) (collectively, 
Telemarketers) are professional fundraising corporations solely 
owned by Richard Troia.94  From 1987 until 1996, VietNow 
contracted with Telemarketing to raise funds.95  VietNow received 
fifteen percent of the funds raised by Telemarketing, which 
retained the other eighty-five percent.96  Armet brokered additional 
out-of-state contracts with third-party professional fundraisers.97  
Those contracts yielded ten to twenty percent of the funds to 
Armet and ten percent to VietNow.98  During the period of the 
contracts, Telemarketers raised over $7.1 million on behalf of 
VietNow with approximately $1.1 million of that amount going to 
the charity.99 
The Attorney General of Illinois filed the initial complaint in 
1991,100 alleging common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, 
statutory fraud, and deceptive trade practices.101  Primarily, the 
complaint alleged misrepresentation of the use of the solicited 
funds.102  Because the charity received only fifteen cents of every 
dollar raised,103 representations to donors that VietNow would 
 
 92. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003). 
 93. See http://www.vietnow.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 94. People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ill. 
2001). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  “VietNow does not complain that it did not receive the amounts for 
which it contracted . . . [or] expressed dissatisfaction with the fund-raising services 
provided by the defendants.”  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id at 291-92. 
 102. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 580 U.S. 600, 608-09 
(2003). 
 103. In fact, there were additional allegations that “of the money raised by 
Telemarketers, VietNow in the end spent only about 3 percent to provide 
17
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benefit from significant portion of funds raised were false, 
deceptive, and fraudulent.104  Affidavits submitted along with the 
complaint alleged a variety of affirmative representations regarding 
the use of donated funds.105  Specific claims Telemarketers made to 
prospective donors involved Thanksgiving food baskets, job 
training, rehabilitation, and other services for veterans.106  One 
donor was allegedly told that ninety percent or more of her 
donation would be used for veterans, and that because VietNow was 
an all-volunteer organization, no labor costs would be incurred.107 
The trial court granted Telemarketers’ motion to dismiss the 
fraud claims.108  At the subsequent appeals before the Illinois 
Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, Telemarketers 
prevailed.109  Not surprisingly, the Illinois Supreme Court relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s previous holdings in Schaumburg, 
Riley, and Munson.110  While there was no specific regulatory 
provision at issue here, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the 
attempt to bring fraud claims against Telemarketers created the 
same sort of First Amendment issue raised by the previous cases.111 
The Illinois Supreme Court echoed each of the lessons 
learned from the charitable solicitation triad.112  Telemarketing’s 
statements were only fraudulent in light of the eighty-five percent 
solicitation fee.113  The fraud claim, therefore, was an attempt to 
regulate for-profit fundraisers using the same fee-based 
percentages struck down earlier.114  Like earlier Supreme Court 
decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that high fundraising 
costs could have a variety of reasons.115  The court expressed 
concern about non-monetary or educational messages contained in 
 
charitable services to veterans.”  Id. at 607 n.1. 
 104. Id. at 609. 
 105. Id. at 608.  Procedurally, such affidavits attached to the complaint become 
part of the complaint “for all purposes.”  Id. at 609 n.3 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/2-606 (2003)).  As a result, an Illinois court can consider such evidence 
under a motion to dismiss. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 609. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 609-10. 
 111. Id. at 611. 
 112. See id. at 609-11. 
 113. Id. at 610. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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the solicitation process.116  Finally, the court read the Riley decision 
to bar a definition of fraud that “places on solicitors the affirmative 
duty to disclose to potential donors, at the point of solicitation, the 
net proceeds to be returned to the charity.”117 
B. Court Holding and Analysis 
By taking up this case, the Court agreed to address an issue 
that had been referred to, but not explicitly dealt with, in its 
previous holdings.118  Unlike the prophylactic measures in 
Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley, this case involved fraud, which the 
First Amendment does not protect.119  The Court was quick to point 
out that fraud actions would not constitute a means to avoid the 
First Amendment problems with those previous measures.120  The 
Court warned off any state regulator who might attempt to “gain 
case-by-case ground [the] Court . . . declared off limits to 
legislators.”121  In other words, a coordinated campaign of fraud 
actions in order to impose a fee-based percentage limitation against 
those charities with high fundraising costs would not survive a 
constitutional challenge.122 
The Court acknowledged two distinctions in the pleadings that 
should allow the suit to proceed past the dismissal stage without 
interfering with the First Amendment.123  First, the complaint 
alleges that Telemarketers affirmatively represented that a major 
portion of donations would be used for specific programmatic 
purposes, despite their knowledge that only fifteen percent of each 
dollar donated was available to the charity.124  The second 
 
 116. Id. at 610-11. 
 117. Id. at 611 (quoting People ex rel. Ryan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 763 
N.E.2d 289, 298 (Ill. 2001)).  But see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 
U.S. 781, 799 n.11, 800 (1988) (approving of requirements to have fundraisers 
affirmatively disclose their professional status and the use of state antifraud laws to 
prohibit fundraisers from “making false statements”). 
 118. Telemarketing Associates, 538 U.S. at 611-12. 
 119. Id. at 612. 
 120. Id. at 617.  “Simply labeling an action one for ‘fraud,’ of course, will not 
carry the day.”  Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id.  Even at the eighty-five percent retention level, the Court is 
unwilling to accept percentage-based enforcement measures. Id. at n.8. 
 123. Id. at 617-18.  When considering the legal sufficiency of a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, an Illinois court will assume the facts are true as pleaded and 
interpret them “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 618 (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ill. 1997)). 
 124. Id. at 618. 
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justification the Court gave for allowing the fraud suit to proceed 
was that the charitable solicitation could be seen as a façade for the 
private inurement of Telemarketers.125  The complaint describes 
the funds raised for the charity as being “merely incidental to the 
fund raising effort.”126  The Court was persuaded that the fraud 
action was properly tailored to the facts as pleaded, and reversed 
and remanded the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court.127 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TELEMARKETING ASSOCIATES DECISION 
A. A Proper Balance 
In Telemarketing Associates, the Supreme Court reached an 
appropriate balance between all of the competing interests.  By 
emphasizing the requirements of a narrowly tailored rule and a 
prohibition against “broad prophylactic” measures, the Court 
forced regulators to focus on the fraudulent component of the 
charitable solicitation.  By emphasizing the protected nature of 
non-fraudulent charitable speech, the Court reaffirmed the 
importance of education and advocacy.  And by allowing a fraud 
case to proceed against a professional fundraiser, the Court put the 
entire for-profit fundraising industry on notice that any fraudulent 
portion of their charitable solicitations would not be protected. 
The Court never strayed from its endorsement of fraud as a 
means to regulate charitable solicitation.128  Indeed, the Court has 
appeared quite sympathetic to the oft-stated purpose behind many 
of these statutes and ordinances: protecting citizens from 
fraudulent charitable solicitations.129  In Telemarketing Associates, 
 
 125. Id. at 618-19. 
 126. Id. at 619 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 127. Id. at 624. 
 128. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (“Nothing we have 
said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons 
may, with impunity, commit frauds on the public.”); Schneider v. Town of 
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (“Frauds may be denounced as offenses and 
punished by law.”). 
 129. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306 (“Without doubt a state may protect its 
citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, 
before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his 
identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.”); 
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164 (“Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the 
name of charity and religion . . . [is insufficient to] empower a municipality to 
abridge freedom of speech and press.”). 
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however, the Court went further by giving insight into its reasons 
for preferring a “properly tailored fraud action” to “broad 
prophylactic rules.”130 
Fraud actions are attractive to the Court in this context 
because by their very nature they are narrowly tailored to 
“particular representations made with intent to mislead.”131  The 
Court considers the burden of proof of all of the elements of a 
fraud action to be sufficient protection for charitable speech.132  
Despite fear by the Illinois Supreme Court that the cause of action 
in this case was an attempt to circumvent previous holdings of the 
Supreme Court, Telemarketing Associates stands for the proposition 
that the First Amendment does not offer protection when 
protected speech is intertwined with fraudulent speech.133 
Even though states may find the factual burden difficult to 
establish, now fraud actions against charities or professional 
fundraisers can proceed without having to address the thorny 
Constitutional issues.134  By succinctly settling the First Amendment 
issues of fraud and charitable solicitation, the Telemarketing 
Associates Court put regulators on firmer ground when taking 
action against unscrupulous fundraising practices.  As a result, 
states can expect a number of cases to settle before trial is even 
necessary.  In fact, Telemarketing Associates and its owner Richard 
Troia settled the Illinois action involved in Telemarketing Associates.135  
The settlement bars Telemarketing Associates from soliciting funds 
from Illinois residents and from soliciting funds on behalf of 
Illinois charities.136 
 
 130. Telemarketing Associates, 538 U.S. at 617 (citations omitted). 
 131. Id. at 621. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. One commentator has suggested that states could implement a system for 
recording and auditing telephone solicitations by professional fundraisers.  Kent 
D. Wittrock, Note, The End of Fraudulent Solicitation–Really?: The Supreme Court in 
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates Provides That Fraudulent Statements in 
Charitable Solicitation are not Protected Speech, 72 UMKC L. REV. 275, 294 (2003).  
While such a scheme would indeed provide the necessary factual basis for fraud 
suits, the additional costs to the states would probably make such a system 
unfeasible.  Furthermore, having just escaped the specter of prior restraints, states 
may be hesitant to conduct random telephone audits that could give rise to 
litigation in the areas of privacy and wiretapping. 
 135. Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Telemarketing Associates 
Settlement Protects Illinois Consumers, Ends More than a Decade of Litigation 
(June 15, 2004) (on file with author). 
 136. Id. 
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The most important question that remains after Telemarketing 
Associates is when a specific statement about the use of funds 
constitutes misrepresentation.  The Court calls the actions of 
Telemarketing “a façade” and the amounts given to VietNow as 
“incidental to the fundraising effort.”137  The specific threshold that 
this represents is unclear.  The Court does not specify whether any 
affirmative statement regarding the use of the funds received will 
be sufficient to meet this requirement.  Having opened the door to 
fraud actions, the Court may have to specify what level of 
fraudulent speech is necessary to constitute a misrepresentation. 
B. Fraud Enforcement Actions 
While the statutory measures may yet remain the domain of 
Sisyphus, discrete fraud actions against professional fundraisers and 
charities will become a more popular route for regulating these 
enterprises.  Coordinated fraud investigations along with a 
changing regulatory environment indicate that Telemarketing 
Associates was decided at the best time to provide guidance to 
regulators seeking to use fraud and related actions against 
professional fundraisers. 
In the years between Riley and Telemarketing Associates, the 
Federal Trade Commission has become an important agency in the 
regulation of charitable solicitation and fraud.  Beginning with 
discrete prosecutions138 and small coordinated campaigns,139 the 
FTC emerged as a federal partner for state regulators in the area of 
charitable solicitation fraud, particularly involving telephone 
solicitations.  As if to reinforce fraud as the next battleground for 
regulators, the FTC announced Operation Phoney Philanthropy a 
 
 137. Telemarketing Associates, 580 U.S. at 618-19 (citations omitted). 
 138. See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Northern Virginia 
Telemarketers of Desert Storm Bracelets Agree to Pay $120,000 to Settle FTC 
Charges (July 13, 1992) (prohibiting the defendants from future 
misrepresentations of the nature of the charitable organization, the portion used 
for charity, and the public benefit derived from money raised). 
 139. In Operation False Alarm, the FTC and state charities regulators targeted 
for-profit fundraisers who misrepresented their ties to public safety organizations 
like police and fire departments.  Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC, 
50 States Announce “Operation False Alarm” (April 9, 1997).  “Operation Missed 
Giving” targeted fraudulent charitable appeals more broadly with a particular 
education focus on telephone solicitation and education.  See Press Release, 
Federal Trade Commission, “Operation Missed Giving” Targets Fraudulent 
Charitable Fundraising (Nov. 12, 1998). 
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mere fifteen days after the Telemarketing Associates decision.140  This 
FTC program showcases new and existing law enforcement actions 
against charities, for-profit fundraisers, and associated 
individuals.141  Such actions were by no means new to the FTC, but 
the scale and scope of this operation points to the ascendancy of 
fraud as a means of regulating charitable solicitation.  The 
involvement of the FTC is crucial for targeting those fraudulent 
charitable solicitation operations that operate in multiple states or 
phone from one state into another.  As a coordinating and 
information sharing resource, the role of the FTC bodes well for 
those regulators combating fraudulent solicitations. 
The involvement of the FTC, however, will come at an 
unexpected cost in the form of additional litigation about the First 
Amendment nature of charitable solicitation.  What may be 
considered settled law at this point could be reopened due to 
pending litigation involving the Federal Do-Not-Call List (DNC).142  
Charitable solicitations are exempt from the requirements of 
DNC,143 but challenges to the law have begun assailing the 
distinction between charitable solicitations as protected speech and 
less-protected commercial speech.144  DNC did impose some limited 
requirements on for-profit fundraisers in the interest of combating 
 
 140. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC and States Unite to Fight 
Fundraising Fraud (May 20, 2003).  See also Press Release, Connecticut Attorney 
General’s Office, Connecticut Participates in “Operation Phony [sic] 
Philanthropy” to Target Fundraising and Charity Fraud (May 20, 2003) (specifying 
lawsuits against Connecticut Vietnam Veterans, Inc. and Vietnam Veterans of 
America, Inc. State Council, among others). 
 141. See FTC v. Bell, No. 03-790DOC (C.D. Cal. filed May 20, 2003); FTC v. W. 
Coast Adver. & Mktg., Inc., No. 03-CV-0980 IEG (S.D. Cal. filed May 14, 2003); 
FTC v. DPS Activity Publ’g, Ltd., No. C-03-1078 (W.D. Wash. filed May 12, 2003); 
FTC v. Greenwell, No. H-03-1553 (S.D. Tex. filed May 8, 2003); FTC v. Cmty. 
Affairs, Inc., No. 03-60852 (S.D. Fla. filed May 7, 2003); FTC v. Benson, No. 3:03-
CV-0951 (N.D. Tex. filed May 6, 2003); FTC v. Greeting Cards of Am., Inc., No. 03-
60746 (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 21, 2003); FTC v. Dr. Clark Research Ass’n, No. 03-CV-
54 (N.D. Ohio filed Jan. 8, 2003); FTC v. Grant Search, Inc., No. 2:02-04174-NKL 
(W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 15, 2002); FTC v. Comstar Communications, Inc., No. CIV-S-
02-0348 (E.D. Cal. filed February 13, 2002).  The majority cause of action in these 
suits are claims under § 5(a) of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive 
trade practices.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2004). 
 142. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C § 6101 (2004)). 
 143. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4 (2003). 
 144. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo. 
2003), rev’d by Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 
2004).  The district court considered the exemption for charitable solicitations to 
be an unconstitutional content-based distinction.  Id. at 1168. 
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fraudulent charitable solicitations.145  These have also become the 
subject of litigation.146  Such litigation could force the Supreme 
Court to more closely examine the commercial nature of charitable 
solicitations and the nature of the intertwining of education, 
advocacy, and commercial transactions. 
C.    Regulatory Changes Since Riley 
Rather than prohibit charitable solicitation altogether, the 
Supreme Court expressed a preference for disclosure requirements 
that “help make contribution decisions more informed.”147  In the 
years since Schaumburg and Riley, public disclosure of a charity’s 
financial records has become commonplace.148  More importantly, 
public awareness of these disclosures through the Internet or the 
media has resulted in increased scrutiny from and accountability to 
the giving public. 
1. IRS Disclosures 
Requirements that a charity or its professional fundraiser 
disclose financial information remains a popular means for 
ensuring accountability of charities and preventing fraudulent 
solicitations.  Adding to the existing disclosure requirements of 
charitable organizations,149 the 104th Congress expanded the 
disclosure requirements for all organizations exempt from taxation 
under I.R.C. § 501(c).150  After the amended law and its subsequent 
rulemaking, the application filed requesting tax-exempt status 
along with the organization’s annual information returns were 
open to public inspection.151  Such information returns contain 
important information regarding the finances and fundraising 
activities of the organization.152  501(c)(3) organizations are 
required to provide copies of these returns for three years after the 
 
 145. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4 (2003). 
 146. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. FTC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Md. 2004). 
 147. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 638 
(1980). 
 148. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 149. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 4, 22. 
 150. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, § 1313, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2004)). 
 151. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d) (2004).  Organizations are required to file an annual 
information return, the IRS Form 990, that specifies income, expenses, salaries, 
and program activities.  26 U.S.C. § 6033(b) (2004). 
 152. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(b) (2004). 
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filing date of the return.153  Individual requests can be fulfilled 
collectively if the returns are widely available, specifically over the 
Internet.154 
These disclosure requirements are significant educational and 
accountability measures.  They aid the regulatory battle against 
charitable solicitation fraud by disseminating information about 
organizations and educating and empowering donors to explore 
the programmatic and financial reporting of an organization that 
requests their donation. 
2. Intermediate Sanctions 
The second key regulatory change affecting charitable 
organizations does not directly address fraud, disclosure, and 
accountability.  Instead, recent legislation seeks to “prevent 
wrongdoing by persons who have a special relationship” with 
charities.155  Along with additional public disclosure requirements, 
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 imposed taxes on a class of individuals 
who engaged in a transaction with the charity that unreasonably 
benefited the individual.156  These taxes are labeled intermediate 
sanctions, and target excess benefit transactions between the 
charity and disqualified persons.157 
Revenue-sharing transactions such as those between charities 
and professional fundraisers resulting in a percentage division of 
funds raised may become part of intermediate sanctions law.158  
 
 153. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d) (2004). 
 154. IRS Procedure and Administration Rule, 26 C.F.R. § 301.6104(d)-2 
(2004).  While it does not satisfy the “widely available” requirement due to a 
technical matter, Guidestar, in partnership with the IRS and the National Center 
for Charitable Statistics, maintains a database of approximately one million 
charities’ information returns.  See http://www.guidestar.org.  The Supreme Court 
examined a copy of VietNow’s IRS Form 990 as part of its decision.  Illinois ex rel. 
Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc. 538 U.S. 600, 607 n.1 (2003). 
 155. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 2 (2003). 
 156. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, § 1311, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2004)). 
 157. “The sanctions are considered intermediate because they are between the 
choices of revocation of tax-exempt status and inaction on the part of the IRS.”  
HOPKINS, supra note 155, at 3.  An excess benefit transaction is one in which the 
economic benefit to the disqualified person exceeds the value of consideration 
received for providing the benefit.  26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(1) (2004).  A disqualified 
person is one “in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.” Id. § 4958(f)(1).  The full scope of this complex regulation is 
beyond this note.  See generally HOPKINS, supra note 155. 
 158. See HOPKINS, supra note 155, at 149-50, 157-58 (describing the history of 
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While the IRS does not consider fundraising percentage fee 
arrangements to be excess benefit transactions per se,159 future 
proposed rulemaking could target such transactions.  By focusing 
on the private benefit to the fundraiser, rather than the language 
used to perform the fundraising, the IRS may be able to succeed 
where state regulators have failed.  Rather than assume that a 
contract with a professional fundraiser with high fees is 
presumptively fraudulent, such a transaction could be 
presumptively one of excess benefit.  The resulting regulation 
could have the same effect to regulate fundraising fees, but without 
involving prior restraints on the protected speech of the charities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
After Riley it may have been unclear what options remained 
available to regulators who sought to protect the public from 
fraudulent charitable solicitation.  Over the years between Riley and 
Telemarketing Associates, fraud actions and mandatory disclosures 
have worked together to provide the best means for regulating this 
area.  Neither fraud actions nor most mandatory disclosures run 
afoul of the First Amendment in the same manner as broad 
prohibitions or strict licensing.  The world has changed since Riley.  
The widespread availability of information about charities has 
created a more informed donor, while abuses continue to attract 
the media and legislators.  Charities and professional fundraisers 
face continued scrutiny over their fundraising and solicitation 
practices, but this is done in the hopes of maintaining a charitable 
sector that continues to attract donations by being open, effective, 
and accountable. 
 
 
revenue-sharing rulemaking and its application in the fundraising context). 
 159. HOPKINS, supra note 155, at 149-50. 
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